In The Philosophical Baby: What Children’s Minds Tell Us About Truth, Love, and the Meaning of Life, Alison Gopnik writes that “Children and adults are different forms of Homo Sapiens”, this from a review of the book by Michael Greenberg in the March 11 issue of the New York Review of Books:
For one thing, the prefrontal lobe, which has a major part in blocking out stimuli from other parts of the brain and fostering internally driven attention, is undeveloped in young children, and doesn’t fully form in most people until they are in their twenties. Internally driven attention, cognitive research suggests, isn’t a capacity that children fully acquire until at least the age of five. What arouses them is what is in front of their eyes, the first burst of information about cause and effect in the physical world.â€
Because of this rather direct link between the physical world and experience, an infant’s perception may be something like ours when we suspend our disbelief and become emotionally engaged in a movie or play. Certainly this is not surprising on some level, for we know we are acting most childlike when we play imaginatively or when we’re able to drop our defenses, built up through years of adolescent and adult training, and experience something new as a child, who’s seeing so much for the first time, might. Now, it appears, there’s increasing quantitative evidence to support our suspicions. But these data go further by suggesting that morality may be different from what Piaget and others thought:
There is a complicated interplay between rules and morality in young children, a sophisticated sensitivity to intention when rules are broken, and a subtle appreciation that some rules are important, others less so. Moral knowledge, Gopnik argues, is imaginative knowledge, a direct outgrowth of empathy, which babies seem to experience in some form or another from almost the moment they are born.â€
While babies certainly have original emotions, they also learn by imitating the joy and sorrow of others. When we smile at a baby, we expect at some point to see that smile mirrored. Perhaps the same is true of sadness though we more often than not try to hide this emotion from children. Gopnik speculates that babies may not see the difference between their emotional reactions and the world’s:
It’s possible that babies literally don’t see a difference between their own pain and the pain of others. Maybe babies want to end all suffering, no matter where it happens to be located. For them, pain is pain and joy is joy. Moral thinkers from Buddha to David Hume to Martin Buber have suggested that erasing the boundaries between yourself and others in this way can underpin morality. We know that children’s conception of a continuous separate self develops slowly in the first five years.
However, because of their ability to empathize, children can also quickly pick up discriminatory behaviors as when they learn to exclude rather than include others because “a tiny, arbitrary distinction becomes a reason for enmity. Children as young as three can refuse to play with another child because of the color of her hair or the clothes that he’s wearing.
While there’s much that I’m skipping in the review, I want to jump to the concluding thought which seems to capture a difference between the Chekhovian concept of description, in which one connects to a narrative along a zoomed path that focuses on details, to the less focused observation often associated with non-narrative poetry and Zen-like ideals:
The Philosophical Baby is both a scientific and romantic book, a result of Gopnik’s charming willingness to imagine herself inside the consciousness of young children. She compares “the lantern consciousness of childhood…to the spotlight consciousness of ordinary adult attention.” With lantern consciousness “you are vividly aware of everything without being focused on any one thing in particular. There is a kind of exaltation and a peculiar kind of happiness that goes with these experiences too.”
Gopnik likens lantern consciousness to Romantic poetry, the uninhibited receptiveness that is the artist’s ideal, and the Zen ideal of “beginner’s mind” where the meditator relinquishes attachment to his inner “I.” “Babies, like Buddhas, are travelers in a little room,” she writes. Lantern consciousness provokes the feeling that “we have lost our sense of self…by becoming part of the world.”
So, it seems, we make it past five years of age, enter first grade, then second. On and on we struggle to organize our identity and our lives, but may only find ourselves most in touch with ourselves and others when we return to a mental state that is similar to a period that we can no longer remember, but that we sense when we’re with a baby who searches our face and smiles.